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Abstract
Linked econometric models can often be viewed upon as a
difference game. In this paper we study linear quadratic
difference games. The Pareto optimal strategies and suffi-
cient conditions for the Nash optimal strategy to be Pareto
optimal will be given.
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1. Introduction
In a previous paper~) it has been motivated why we are in-
terested in N-person nonzero sum difference games. We as-
sumed the system to be linear and time-invariant and the costs
to be quadratic.
Formalizing this, we start with a system, given by the tuple
{T, UIr U2,..., UN, U1, U2,..., UN, Z, Z, Y, Y, X, f, p}
where
time T - {t~, tOtl,...,tf},
input alphabet (control Space) for the N players
sk
Uk c Il~ , k- 1,2,...,N,
inputs (control functions) for the N players
Uk - {functions uk(.):T-.Uk}, k - 1,2,...,N,
exogenous input alphabet Z c~r~
exogenous inputs Z - {functions z(.):T~Z},
output alphabet Y c ~m~
outputs Y - {functions y(.): T-.Y},
state space X c ~n~
state transition function f(.) :T x X x Ul x U2 x... x Un x Z-~X
read-out function ~(.) : T x X-~ Y.
ic) Plasmans, J. (1978), Linked Econometric Models as a Differen-
tial game; Nash Optimality, Research Memorandum, Tilburg
University.
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The output equation is
Y(t) -~(t, x(t)), t- t~, t~tl,..., tf.
We assumed the system to be linear and time-invariant, so we
can write the state equation and the output equation as follows:
N




y(t) - F x(t), t- t~,t~tl,...,tf;
A: (n x n) matrix
Bi: (n x si) matrix, i- 1,2,...,N,
C: (n x r) matrix,
F: (m x n) matrix.
Each player wants to choose his control function or strategy
such that his costs are minimized.
We assumed the costs to be quadratic and to be based upon
deviations from some ideal path for both the output- and
control functions, set by the player involved.




} ~ s {f y(t)-pk(t)1 ~C~(t)[Y(t)-pk(t)] t
t-to
N
t E [ui(t)-{li(t)]'R~(t)[ui(t)-fli(t)] }, k-1,2,...,N,i-1
where
pk(t)- F S~(t)~ t-t~,tOfl,...,tf, alld L1k(t), t-t~,t~tl,...,tf1, are the
ideal paths for the output- and controlf~tions respectively,
set by player k, k-1,2,...,N;
Qk(t): (m x m) matrix, t-t~, tOfl,...,tf; k-1,2,...,N;
1~1(t): ( Si X Si) matrlX, i-1r2,-..rN, k-1,2,...,N, t-t~rt~fl,...,tf1;
without loss of generality we can assume these matrices to be
symmetric;
it is natural to assume that the matrices Qk(t), k-1,2,...,N,
t-tp,t~~-1,...,tf, and R~(t), k-1,2,...,N, t-t~,t~tl,...,tf l,are pOSitiVe
semi-definite;
to avoid singularities we assume the matrices Rkk(t) to be
positive definite;
in this paper we assume that the matrices Rki(t), k~i, are
also positive semi-definite; this assumption implies that non-
negative costs are assigned by player k, when any other player i
deviates from his ideal control path.
Wes-hall call a strategy admissable if it takes values in the
input alphabet.
We distinguish two possible strategies:
a) open loop strategies, where each player determines his policy
at the beginning of the planning period:
L]k(t) - pk(X~,t)r 1t - 1,2,...,N, t- t~,tOtl,...,tf1;
b) closed loop strategies, where each player determines his
policy at each time step, using new observations about the
- 6 -
state of the system; in this way he is willing to react
to the strategies of the other players; such a strategy is
also called a state-feedback strategy:
uk(t) - pk(x(t),t), k- 1,2,...rN, t- t0,t~fl,...,tf1.
Crucial is, in what sense each player cooperates with other
players and what each player expects about the strategies of
the other players.
In a previous paper~)the Nash concept of optimality was de-
veloped; this concept presupposes a competitive mood of play
and an expectation of rational behaviour of the other players.
In this paper we will at first focus on the Pareto concept
of optimality, which presupposes a cooperative mood of play and
afterwards we will work out sufficient conditions for the
Nash equilibrium solution to be Pareto optimal. We claim that
whenever a Nash optimal solution does not belong to the set of
Pareto optimal solutions, at least one player is willing to
coordinate the policies in order to obtain lower costs.
2. Pareto Optimality.
Definition 1.
A control N-tuple u(.) -( ul(.), u2(.),...,i1N(.)) is called a
Pareto optimal ( P.O.-) control if and only if for each admissable
control N-tuple u(.):
a) either all costs are the same, i.e.
Jk(~.u(.).Y(.)) - Jk(x~, u(.). y(.)) for all k - 1,2,...,N,
b) or thern exists at least one kE{1,2,...,N}, such that
Jk(x~,u(.),Y(.)) ~ Jk(x0.u(.),Y(.)).
In this case it is presupposed that the players cooperate,
have confidence in one another and negotiate with each other.
~ See note page .
-~-
P.O.-solutions can be characterized as the set of non-
inferior solutions; any solution, not belonqing to this set,
is dominated by some solutíon of this P.O.-set, in the sense,
that at least one player can do better,,while the others do
not worse.
When we change a P.O.-strategy, at least one of the players will
be worse off.
P.O.-solutions are not unique. There may be P.O.-solutions,
that dominate Nash optimal (N.O.-) solutions. We will illustrate
this by an example.
Example
Suppose we consider a two person, nonzero sum, static game,





J1(ul,u2) and J2(ul,u2) are the cost functionals to be minimized
by player 1 and 2, respectively, where ul and u2 are the (scalar)
decision variables. In figure a) the contours of constant costs
in the ul u2 space are drawn for both players. The dashed line
xx represents the locus of strategies of player 1, that mini-
mize his costs for fixed values of u2. Similarly, yy is the
locus of rational strategies of player 2 for fixed values of ul.
The intersection of these two lines is the N.O.-solution. It
is easy to see from figure a), that the points within the
shaded area are superior to the N.O.-solution for both players.
However, cooperation of both players is absolutely necessary
to reach such a situation; a solution within the shaded area
canr~t be arrived at by unilateral deviation of any one player
from his N.O.-strategy and it is not safe against cheating by
one of the players.
When the players are willing to cooperate or to negatiate, the
solution set of interest becomes the set of P.O.-solutions,
which is the locus of tangential points of the iso-cost contours,
determined by the two cost functionals, represented by the dark
line joining O1 and 02; this is precisely the set of non-in-
ferior points as characterized above.
What we did want to show, namely a certain suboptimality of the
N.O.-solutions as compared to some P.O.-solutions, is immediate-
ly clear now from the figure.
How can we find Pareto optimal solutions?
Definition 1 implies that it is a matter of minimization of
the vector valued function
IJ1(x~,u(.).Y(.))~ J2(x~,u(.)Y(.))....,J N(x~,u(.),Y(.))I'.
Tle can transfer the whole problem to a one player, i.e. standard
optimal control, problem. In case the set of all possible values
of the cost tuples (J1, Jz,...JN) form a convex set, solving
this optimal control problem will trace out all the P.O.-
solutions. The following lemmas embody these sufficient (and
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in case of a convex set also necessary) conditions for P.O.-
solutions.
Lemma 1.
A control N-tuple u(.) is P.O. if there exists a vector aE HtNNwith ak~0, k-1,2,...,N, and E ak - 1, such that
k-1
N
J (x~,u(.),Y(.)): - E ak Jk(x~,n(.).Y(.)) ~.
k-1
N
`- J(x~,u(.).Y(.)): - E ak Jk(x~.u(.).Y(.))
k-1
for all admissable N-tuples u(.).
Proof.
Consider an admissable control N-tuple u(.).
The inequality of this lemma implies either
J(x~.u(.).Y(.)) - J(xp,u(.),Y(.)) or
J(x~,u(.).Y(.)) ~ J(x~,u(.),Y(.)).
If J(x0,u(.),Y(.)) - J(x~,u(.),Y(.)) then either
Jk(x~.u(.),Y(.)) - Jk(x0,u(.),Y(.)) for all ]cE{1,2,...,N} or
there is at least one k E{1,2,,,,,N}, such that
Jk(x~,u(.).Y(.)) ~ Jk(x~,u(.),Y(.)).
If J(x~,u(.),Y(.)) ~ J(x~,u(.),Y(.)) then
there is at least one kE{1,2,...,N} , such that
Jk(x~,u(.)~Y(.)) ~ Jk(x~,u(.).Y(.)).
According to definition 1, u(.) is a P.O.-solution.
Q.E.D.
A slightly different version of lemma 1 is:
- 10 -
Lemma 1 '
A control N-tuple u(.) is P.O. if there exists a vectoraE ~N
with a' 0, k-1,2,...,N, and ~ a- 1, such thatk - k-1 k
N
J(x0,u(.),Y(.)): - E ak Jk(x0,u(.).Y(.)) ~
k-1
N
~ J(x0,u(.).Y(.)): - E ak Jk(x0,u(.).Y(.))
k-1
for all admissable N-tuples u(.) with u(.) ~ u(.)
(i.e.,u(t) ~ u(t) for some t E{tO,tOtl,...,tf-1}).
Proof.
Immediately clear from definition 1.
Remarks.
1) In lemma 1 the components of a must be strictly positive,
but the minimum of J(x0,u(.),y(.)) does not correspond
to a unique solution, whereas in lemma 1' some components
of a may be zero, but the minimum of J(x0,u(.),y(.)) does
correspond to a unique solution.
2) An admissable N-tuple, that yields the minimum of any players
costs and that is unique, is P.O., because it can be made to
fit lemma 1' .
Lemma 2.
Let U1 x U2 x ...x UN be a convex set and let J1,J2,...,JN be
real-valued convex functions, defined on U1 x U2 x...x UN.
If the control N-tuple u(.) is P.O. then there exists a vector
N
a E]RN with ak ' 0, k- 1,2,...,N, and E ak - 1, such that
k-1
N
J(x0,u(.)~Y(.)): - E ak Jk(x0.u(.)~Y(.)) `
k-1
N
~ J(x0,u(.).Y(.)):- E ak Jk(x0,u(.),Y(.))
k-1
for all admissable N-tuples u(.).
Proof .
Because u(.) is P.O., we can conclude from definition 1 that,
for all admissable N-tuples u(.), the system
J~~(x~.u(.).Y(.)) - Jk(x~,u(.)~Y(.)) ~ 0, k-1,2,...,N,
does not have a solution in U1 x 112 x :., x IIN.
It is a well known fact~) that in this case there exists a




E ak (Jk(xp,u(.).Y(.)) - Jk(x~,u(.).Y(.)))' 0
k-1
for all admissable N-tuples u(.).
Q.E.D.
3. Pareto optimal Strategies in Linear Quadratic Difference Games.
Because of the model-assumptions-linear system and quadratic
cost functionals with positive (semi-)definite matríces-we can
conclude from paragraph 2, that the set of P.O.-controls can
be found by solving the following problem:
N
minimize J(x0,u(.),Y(.)): - E ak Jk(x~,u(.),Y(.))
{ul(.),u2(.),...,uN(.)} k-1
where
ie) See,e.g., Tàkayama, A. (1974), Mathematical, Economics, The
Dryden Press, Hinsdale, Illinois, pp. 67-68.
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Jk(x~,u(.),Y(.)): - ~ [Y(tf)-Qk(tf)]' 4k(tf) [Y(tf)-jYk(tf)] f
tf1
f~. E {( Y(t)-j~k(t)l ' 4k(t)[ Y(t)-Qk(t)) t
t-t~
N









Y(t) - F x(t), t-t~,tOtl,...,tf
N
for all a E IRN with a ' 0 and E a - 1.k - k-1 k
The Pareto concept of optimality,which presupposes that all
N players form a coalition, leads in fact to a one player pro-
blem, i.e.~o a standard optimal control problem.
We see this clearly when we do some rewriting.
Define for t- t~, t~fl, ..., tf-1 and i- 1,2,..., N:
~ul (t)1 ~U1 (t)
u2 (t)I fl2 (t)





RiN ( t )
Using Qk(t) - F Rk(t), t- t0,t~fl,...,tf, k- 1,2,..., N,
we arrive at the following problem:
Problem 1 N




f E[ u(t)-fl(t)] ' ai Ri(t) [ u(t)-fl(t)] }
i-1
subject to
x(ttl) -(IfA)x(t) f s u(t) t c z(t), t- to,totl,...,tf 1,
x(t~) - xp




Let E ai Ri(t),
i-1
tf1 N
t E ~{ E [x(t)-Ri(t)] ~ F'ai 4i(t) F[x(t)-Ri(t)l ft-t~ i-1
t-t~,t~tl,...,tf-1, be positive definite.
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The solution of problem (1) is given by
N
u(t) --( E ai Ri(t) f B'L(tfl)B)-1B'.
í-1
(2) .(L(tfl) ((ItA)x(t)fB fl(t)~-Cz(t)) t f(tfl)) t fl(t),
t - t~,t~fl,...,tf1
where




L(t), t- t~,tOtl,...,tf, is the symmetric, positive semi-
definite solution of the backward recursive Riccati equations
N
(4a) L(t) - F' E aí Qi(t) F f
i-1
N
t(IfA)' L(ttl)(I-B( E ai Ri(t)tB'L(ttl)B)-1B' L(ttl))(ItA)
i-1
N
(4b) L(tf) s F' E ai Qi(tf) F
i-1
and
f(t), t-t~,t~fl,...,tf, is the solution of the backward
recursive tracking equations
N
(Sa) f'(t) -- E Ri(t)' F' ai Qi(t) F f
i-1
- ls -
t(f'(ttl)~ B Q(t) t C ~(t)~' L(ttl)).
N
.(I-B( E ai Ri(t) t B'L(tfl)B)-1 B'L(ttl))(IfiA)
1-1
N
(5b) f'(tf) -- E xi(tf)'F' ai Qi(tf) F
i-1
Remarks
1) By induction it is easy to see, that~ whenever a solution
of the Riccati equations (4a) and (4b) exists, it must be
symmetric .
2) Because we assumed the matrices Rki(t), t-t~,t~tl,...,tf-1,
i-1,2,...,N, k-1,2,...,N, to be positive semi-definite and
the matrices Rkk(t), t-t~,t~fl,...,tf-1, k-1,2,...,N, to
be positive definite, ae need for all i E{1,2,,,,,N}
only one Rki(t) being positive definite with ak ~ 0,
k- 1,2,...,N, to be able to conclude, that the matrices
N
E ai Ri(t), t- t~,tOfl,...,tf-1, are positive definite.
i-1
From this we see, by induction, that, whenever a solution
of the Riccati equations (4a) and (4b) exists, it must be
positive semi-definite and solving the backward recursive
equations, we find, step by step, that
N
( E ai Ri(t) tB'L(ttl)B)-1 exists and is positive definite.
i-1
We will give two proofs of theorem 1; one is straightforward
the other makes use of Pontryagin'sdiscrete minimum principle.
Proof of theorem 1
A) For all (n x n) matrices L(t) and(n x 1) vectors f(t),
t- t~, tOfl,...,tf, we have
- 16 -
x'(tf)L(tf)x(tf) - x'(t~)L(t~)x(t~) -
tf-~
- E {x(ttl)'L(ttl)x(tfl) - x(t)'L(t)x(t)}
and
tf -1








f(tf): -- E F' ai 4i(tf) F Ai(tf)
i-1
we can rewrite the cost functional as follows:
N
~x'(t0)L(to)x(to) t f'(to)x(t0) .~. ~ lEl Ri'(tf)F'ai Qi(t~ F Ri(tf) f
tf1
E {~,x'(ttl)L(tf))x(ttl) -~x'(t)L(t)x(t) f f'(tfl)x(ttl) - f'(t)x(t) t
t-t~
N N
f~ x'(t)F' E ai Qi(t)F x(t) - E Ri'(t)F'ai 4i(t)F x(t) t
i-1 i-1
N N
f~ lEl Ri'(t)F'ai4i(t)F Ri(t) t~ lEl [u(t)-fl(t)l'ai Ri(t)Iu(t)-fl(t)]}.
Now we use the state equation
x(ttl) -(ItA)x(t) f B[u(t) - Q(t)] f s fl(t) f C z(t)
to arrive at the cost functional:
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tf N
~ x'(tfl)L(t~)x(t~) t f'(t~)x(tfl) f E ~ E áti'(t)F'ai Qi(t)F Ri(t) t
t-t~ i-1
tf1 N
f E {~[u(t) - fl(t)] '( E ai Ri(t) f B' L(tfl)B) [ u(t) - U(t)] f
t-t0 i-1
N
f~ x'(t)((IfA)'L(tfl)(ItA) - L(t) t F' E ai Qi(t) F)x(t) f
i-1
f~[B fl(t) f C z(t)]' L(ttl) [B fl(t) t C z(t)] t
t[u(t)-fl(t)] 'B'L(tfl) (ItA)x(t)t[B fl(t)fC z(t)]' L(ttl) (ItA)x(t) t
f[B fl(t)f C z(t)]' L(tfl) B[u(t)-tt(t)] t
N
t(f'(tfl)(ItA) - f'(t) - E Ri'(t)F' ai Qi(t) F)x(t) t
i-1
f f' (ttl)B[u(t)-fl(t)] t f' (ttl)[ B fl(t) t C z(t)] }
Using the Riccati equations (4a) and the tracking equations (5a)
we arrive, after some tedious arithmetic, at the cost functional:
tf N
~ x'(t0)L(t~)x(tfl) f f'(t0)x(t~) f E ~, E:ti'(t)F'ai 4i(t)F Ri(t) f
t-t0 i-1
tf1
t E {~[B fl(t) f C z(t)]' (L(tfl)-L(tfl)B.
t-t~
N
.( E ai Ri(t) f B'L(ttl)B)-1 B'L(tfl))[B Q(t) t C z(t)] t
i-1
N




f~ f'(ttl)(-B( E ai Ri(t) t B'L(ttl)B)-1 B')f(tfl)} t
i-1
tf1 N
t E ~[u(t) - fl(t) t( E ai Ri(t) f B'L(ttl)B)-1 B'.
t-t~ i-1
.(L(tfl) ((ItA)x(t) f B fl(t) f C z (t)) f f(ttl)j '.
N
.( E ai Ri(t) t B'L(tfl)B) [ u(t) - fl(t) f
i-1
N
f( E aiRi(t) f B'L(ttl)B)-1 B' (L(ttl) ((ItA)x(t)i-B {i(t)fC z(t))tf(ttl))J
i-1
So the cost functional has the form:
tf-1
c t s n(t)' M(t)n(t)
t-t~
where c is a constant,
n(t):- u(t)- fl(t)tk; 1(t)B'(L(tfl)((IfA)x(t}FB fl(t)tC z(t)) t f(tfl))
N
M(t):- E ai Ri(t) t B'L(ttl)B
i-1
According to remark 2 we know that M(t), t- t~, t~tl,...,tf-1,
is positive definite: hence we achieve minimal costs if we
choose n(t) - 0, t- t0,t~tl,...,tf-1, or
u(t) - ti(t) - M 1(t)B' (L(tfl) ((IfA)x(t)tB fl(t)~-C z(t)) f f(tfl)),
t - t~, tOtl,...,tf1,.Q.E.D.
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B) We define the Hamiltonian function H by
N
H(t~x~u.p): -~ E [x - áti(t)]~ F' ai Qi(t) F[x - iti(t)] t
i-1
N
f~[ u- íí(t)] ' E ai Ri (t) [ u- Q(t)] t
i-1
f p' (A x t B u t C z(t) )
According to Pontryagin's discrete minimum principle~) we have
for the optimal control law u(.), the corresponding state
trajectory x(.) and the corresponding co-state trajectory p(.)
the following relationships:
(6a) x(tfl) - x(t) - ap (t, x(t), u(t), p(tfl)) -
- A x(t) t B u(t) f C z(t), t- tO,tOfl,...,tf1,
(6b) x(t0) - x0;
(7d) p(ttl) - p(t) - - aHaX (t, x(t), u(t), p(ttl)) -
N




(7b) p(tf) - E F' ai Qi(tf)F [ x(tf) - Ri(tf)]
i-1
i:) See, e.g., Plasmans, J.,(1975), Production Investment Behaviour,
Tilburg University Press, Rotterdam, pp. 298-302.
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N
(8) áu (t, x(t), u(t), p(tfl)) - E ai Ri(t) (u(t) - u(t)] t B'p(ttl) - 0,
i-1
t - tO,tOtl,...,tf1,
Furthermore we postulate a linear relationship between the
optimal state trajectory x(.) and the optimal co-state trajectory
P ( ) .
(9) p(t) - L(t)x(t) t f(t), t- tO,tOtl,...,tf .
Combining (3) and (9) yields:
N
u(t) --( E ai Ri(t))-1 B' (L(ttl) x(tfl) t f(ttl)) t fl(t),
i-1
t - t0, tOfl,...,tf1.
Using ( 6a) we get:
N
u(t) - fl(t) -- ( E ai Ri (t) )-1 B' (L(ttl) (( IfA) x(t)t B(u(t) - fl(t) ) f
i-1
f B fl(t)t C z(t)) t f(ttl)),
t - tO,tOtl,...,tf1.
or
u(t) - fl(t) --(If( E ai Ri(t))-1 B'L(ttl)B)-1( E ai Ri(t))-1 B'.
i-1 i-1





u(t) - fl(t) -( E ai Ri(t) t B'L(ttl)B)-1 B'.
i-1
(10)
.(L(ttl)((ItA) x(t) t B Q(t) t C z(t))t f(ttl)),
t - tO,tOfl,...,tf1,
How can we calculate L(t) and f(t), t- t0,tofl,...,tf?
From (9) and (7b) we have:
N N
(11) L(tf) - F' E ai Qi(tf)F and f(tf) -- E F' ai 4i(tf)F Ri(tf)
i-1 i-1
and substituting (9) into (7a) we get:
L(tfl) x(ttl) f f(tfl) - L(t) x(t) - f(t) -
N
- -F' E ai Qi(t)F[x(t) -Ri(t)] - A' (L(ttl)x(ttl)ff(tfl)),
i-1
t - t0, tOfl,...,tf-1
Using (6a) and (10) and rearranging terms, we get:
N
(ZtA)'L(ttl)((IfA)x(t) - B( E ai Ri(t) t B'L(ttl)B)-1 B'.
i-1
.(L(tfl) ((IfA)x(t) f B fl(t) t C z(t) ) f f(tfl)~ t B fl(t) t C z(t) ) t
N
f(ItA)'f(ttl)-L(t)x(t)-f(t) - -F' E ai Qi(t)F [x(t)-Ri(t)] ,
i-1
t - t0, tOtl,...,tf1.
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Grouping linear terms in x(t) and also grouping constant tcrms,
we observe, that this relationship is true if L(t) and f(t),
t- tO,tOtl,...,tf-1, satisfy the following backward recursive
equations:
N
(12) L(t) -(ItA)'L(ttl)(I-B( E ai Ri(t) t B'L(ttl)B)-1 B'L(t-I-1))(ItA) t
i-1
N




(13) f(t) --F' E ai Qi(t)F Ri(t) f(IfA)'(I-L(ttl)B.
i-1
N
.( E ai Ri(t)tB'L(ttl)B)-1 B'(f(ttl)tL(ttl)(B Q(t)fC z(t))),
1-1
t - tO,tOtl,...,tf-1
(10) f (11) f (12) t ( 13): Q.E.D.
Remarks.
N
1) For each vector aE IItN with ak ~ 0, k- 1,2,...,N, and E ak - 1
we found a Pareto optimal feedback control law. k-1
By solving the state equations, we can write the current state
explicitly as a function of the initial state and the past
values of the control functions; this yiélds the open loop control
law. In case of one player the optimal open loop- and closed loop
control laws give the same result.
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2) Although proof A needs a little bit more computational effort
than proof B, it has the advantage, that it is straightforward
and it gives an explicit expression for the costs; we will state
this again in corollary 1.
3) The Pareto optimal control law (2) can be "separated" into
P.O.-control laws for the N players if Rki(t) - 0, i~ k,
i- 1,2,...,N, k- 1,2,...,N, t- t~,tOtl,...,tf-1 and
ak ~ 0 for all k E{1,2,...,N} ; we will show this in corollary 2.
Corollary 1.
The Pareto optimal costs for problem ( 1) are given by:
tf N
~ x'(t~)L(t~)x(t~)tf'(tC)x(t~) t E~ E Ri'(t)F'ai Qi(t)F Ri(t) f
t-t0 i-1
tf 1
t E {~ [B fl(t) t C z(t)]' L(ttl) (I-B.
t-t~
N
.( E ai Ri(t) f B'L(ttl)B)-1 B'L(ttl)) [ B fl(t) t C z(t)] f
i-1
N
t f' (ttl) ( I-B( E ai Ri(t) f B'L(tfl)B)-1 B'L(tfl))[B fl(t)t C z(t)] f-
i-1
N
-~ f'(tfl)B( E ai Ri(t) t B'L(ttl)B)-1 B'f(tfl)}
i-1
Proof.
Follows directly from proof A of theorem 1.
Corollary 2.
If Rki(t) - ~, 1~ k, i- 1,2,...,N, k- 1,2,...,N,
t- t~, t~tl,...,tf-1, then for each vector aEB2N with ak ~ 0,
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N
k- 1,2,...,N, and E ak - 1,
k-1
a P.O.-control law for player k, k- 1,2,...,N, is given by:
ttk(t) --~ R~ 1(t)Bk'L(tfl)D 1(ttl) ((IfA)x(t)tB fl(t) f C z(t)) f
-~ R~1(t)B~'D 1(ttl)f(tfl) f t3k(t), t- tg,t~tl,..,tf1,
where
N
D 1(t-t-1): - I-B( E ai Ri(t)tB'L(tfl)B)-1 B'L(ttl), t- t~,t~fl,...,tf 1.
i-1
Proof.
If Y-1 and (YtX)-1 exist,we have the matrix identity
(Y f X)-1 - Y 1(I-X(YtX)-1)
(because (YtX) (YtX)-1 - I ~ Y(YtX)-1 - I-X(YfX)-1).
N
Using this with X: - B'L(ttl)B and Y: - E ai Ri(t), we can write for the
P.O.-solution (2): i-1
u(t) --( E ai Ri(t))-1(I-B'L(t-F1)B( E ai Ri(t)fB'L(tfl)B)-1)B'.
i-1 i-1
.(L(tfl)((IfA)x(t)tBQ(t)fCz(t))tf(tfl)~U(t) -





--( E ai Ri(t))-1 B'D 1(tfl)'.
i-1
. (L(tfl) ( (IfA)x(t)tB(1(t)fCz(t) )tf (tfl) )tfl(t) .
It is easy to see, that
D 1(tfl)'L(ttl) - L(tfl)D 1(ttl), t- t~,t~fl,...,tf1.
~urthermore,





E ai Ri (t) -
i-1


















4. Incentives to Cooperate.
ie )
We claimed that whenever the Nash optimal solution does not
belong to the set of Pareto optimal solutions at least one
player is willing to coordinate the policies. From this it
is natural to ask ourselves the question: when does the N.O.-
solution belong to the set of P.O.-solutions and when it does
not?
In this paragraph we make the assumption:
Rkl(t) - 0, i- 1,2,...,N, k- 1,2,...,N, t- t~,t~tl,...,tf-1.




(14a) u~k(t)'- - 1~1 (t)Bk'Kk(tfl)E 1(ttl) I(ItA)x~(t)- F. BiRii-1(t)Bi'c~i(ttl)t
1-1
N
f iElBifli(t)fCz(t)1 -F~ 1(t)Bk'gk(ttl)f~(t),
t- t0,t~tl,...,tf1, k- 1,2,...,N,
where E(ttl): - I f E BiRii 1(t)Bi'Ki(ttl)
i-1
or, equivalently,
(14b) uk(t) - -~ 1(t)Bk (Kk(ttl)x~(ttl)fgk(tfl))filk(t),
t- t~,t~fl,...,tf 1, k- 1,2,...,N.
ie)Although in an entirely different way, incentives to cooperate
among players in linear-quadratic difference games are also
analysed by De Bruyne, G., (1976), Incentives to Cooperation,
mimeographed version for a Ph. D.-thesis, Catholic University
of Louvain.




Nfor every vector aE ~tN with ak ~ 0, k- 1,2,...,N, and E ak - 1:
i-1
(15a) uk(t) --~1 R~ 1(t)Bk'L(ttl)D 1(tfl)((ItA)x(t)fBfl(t)fCz(t)) t
k
- ~ R~ 1(t)Bk'D 1(ttl)'f(tfl)ttlk(t),
t- t~,totl,--.,tf 1, k- 1,2,...,N.
It is easy to see, starting from equation (2), using the state
equation, or from proof B of theorem 1, that relationship (15a)
is equivalent to:
(15b) tik(t) - - ál 2~1(t)Bk'(L(ttl)x(ttl)ff(ttl))tfl (t),
k ~c
t- t0.t~f1,-...tf 1, k- 1,2,...,N.
- Backward recursive Riccati equations:
for the closed loop N.O.-solution:
(16a) iCk(tf) - F'Qk(tf)F, k - 1,2,...,N;
(16b) ICk(t) - F'Qk(t)F f (ItA)'E 1(tfl)'ICk(t-F-1).
. (IfBk i~1(t)Bk'ICk(tfl) )É1(ttl) (IfA),
t- t~,t~tl,...,tf 1, k- 1,2,...,N;
for the P.O.-solutions:
N




(17b) L(t) - F' E ai Qi(t)F t(IfA)'L(tfl)D 1(tfl)(ItA)
i-1
t - t~,tOtl,...,tf 1.
- Backward recursive tracking equations:
for the closed loop N.O.-solution :
(18a) gk(tf)- -F'Qk(tf)FStk(tf), k - 1,2,...,N;
(18b) gk(t) --F'Qk(t)F S:~t(t) t(IfA)' E 1(ttl)' .
. (Ifxk (ttl)
k 7tx 1(t) Bk' ) .
N N
.(gk(ttl)tICk(ttl)E 1(tfl)( E Bi~31(t)fCz(t)- E BiRii 1(t)Bi'gi(tt~)),
i-1 i-1
t - t~, t~tl,...,tf1;
for the P.O.-solutions:
N
(19a) f(tf) -- E F' ai Qi(tf) F Sti(tf);
i-1
N
(19b) f(t) --F' E ai Qi(t) F Ri(t) t(ItA)' D 1(ttl)'.
i-1
. (L(ttl) ( B fl(t)fC z (t) )tf (ttl)), t - t0,t~t1, ...,tf1.
Before we give sufficient conditions for the closed loop N.O.-
solution to be P.O. (in theorem 2), we first prove some lemmas.
Lemma 3.
For all t E{t~fl,...,tf} we have:





D 1(ttl) - I-B( E ai Ri(t) f B'L(tfl)B)-1 B'L(ttl).
i-1
when (IfST')-1 and (I-FT'S)-1 exist, we have the matrix identitye
(I t SP')-1 - Z- S(I t T'S)-1 T'
(because (I f ST')(I - S(I t T'S)-1T') -
- I t SI" - S(I t T'S)-~' - ST'S(I f T'S)--T' -
- I f ST' - S((I t T'S)-1 t T'S(I f T'S)-1)T' - I).
N
Hence, with S: - B and T': - ( E aiRi(t))-1B'L(tfl), we have:
i-1
N N
(ItB( E aiRi(t))-1 B'L(ttl))-1 - I-B(It( E aiRi(t))-1 B'L(ttl)B)-1 .
i-1 i-1
N




D(ttl) - ItB( E aiRi(t))-1 B'L(tfl) -
i-1
N
- It E al Bi Rii-1(t) Bi'L(ttl),i-1 i
so that from the assumptions of this lemma:
N





For all t E{tOfl,...,tf} we have:
if Bi'K~(t) - ~, i ~ j, i- 1,2,...,N, j - 1,2,...,N, then
a) Kk(t)E(t) - Kk(t)(IfBk R~ 1(t-1)Bk'Kk(t)) - E'(t)Kk(t), k- 1,2,...,N;
b) Kk(t)É 1(t) - É1(t)' Kk(t), k- 1,2,...,N.
Proof. N
a) Kk(t) E(t) - Kk(t)(It E Bi Rii 1(t-1)Bi'Ki(t)) -
i-1
- I~(t) (IfBk R~1 (t-1)B~'Kk(t) ) -
-(ItKk(t)Bk R~ 1(t-1)Bk')Kk(t) - E'(t)Kk(t), k- 1,2,...,N.
b) E 1(t)' Kk(t) - E 1(t)' Kk(t)E(t)E 1(t) -





If Bi' K~(t) - 0, i~ 7r i- li2i~--~Nr J- 1,2,...,N,
t- tOfl,...,tf, then the matrix-Riccati and tracking equations
(16b) and (18b) reduce to:
(16b') Kk(t) - F'Qk(t)F t (IfA)'E 1(tfl)'Kk(tfl)(IfA),
t- t0, tOtl,...,tf 1, k- 1,2,...,N.
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(18b') gk(t) - -F'Qk(t)F itk(t) t (ItA)'E 1(ttl)' .
.(I~(ttl) (B Q(t) t C z(t)) f gk(ttl)),
t- t~,tOtl,...,tf1, k- 1,2,...,N.
Proof .
(16b'): immediately clear from lemma 4a.
(18b'):
(ItA)'E 1(ttl)'(ItKk(ttl) Bk ~ 1(t) Bk').
N
.(gk(ttl).fKk(tfl)É 1(tfl))(B Q(t) f C z(t) - E BiR i 1(t)Bi'gi(tfl)) -
i-1 i




f Kk(tfl) ( B fl(t)fC z(t) - E BiRii-1(t)Bi'gi(tfl))) -
1-1




t- t~,t~tl,...,tf1, k- 1,2,...,N.
Lemma 5.




a) L(t) - E ai Ki(t), t- t~tl,...,tf, and
i-1





1 Bk'L(t) - 1 Bk' E ai Ki(t) - Bk'Kk(t),




We wíll proof this by induction:
N
(i) t- tf: a) L(tf) - s ai Ki(tf) fran ( 16a) and (17a)
i-1
k - 1,2,...,N.
b)We know that for all i E {1,2,...,N}




Bi' E aj Kj (tf)
j-1
N N
~ Bi' E aj Kj(tf) - 0~ Bi' E aj Kj(tf) Bi - 0.
j-1 j-1
j~i j~i
Because aj ~ 0, j- 1,2,...,N and Kj(tf) positive semi-
definite, j- 1,2,...,N, we can conclude, that for all
columns bik, k- 1,2,...,si, of Bi, for all i- 1,2,...,N,
i ~ j,
b~ Kj (tf)b~ - 0,
and since Kj(tf), j- 1,2,...,N, is both symmetric and
positive semi-definite, we can split this matrix as
Kj(tf) - Tj(tf)Tj~(tf). j - 1,2,...,N,
where Tj(tf), j- 1,2,...,N, are lower triangular matrices
with non ~negative elements on the diagonal.
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Hence, we have:
b~'Tj(tf)T~(tf)b~ - 0 for all k E {1,2,...,si} , i~ j,
i E {1,2,...,N}, j E{1,2,...,N} ,
so that b~' Tj (tf) - 0 ~
~ b~' Tj(tf)Tj' (tf) - 0 a
~ b~' Kj(tf) - 0 for all k E{1,2,...,si} ~
~ Bi' Kj(tf) - 0 for all i~ j, iE{1,2,...,N} , jE{1,2,...,N},
(ií) Suppose (a) and (b) are true for t-t', t'fl,...,tf, then:




- F' E ai Qi(t'-1)F t(I-F-A)'D 1(t')' L(t')(ItA) -
i-1
N
- F' E a; Q;(t'-1)F t(ItA)'E 1(t')' L(t')E(t')E 1(t')(IfA) -
? i-1
( lemna 3 )














- E ai Ki(t'-1).
T i-1
(16b)
b) Here we can follow exactly the same reasoning as in (i), part
(b), except for t- t'-1 ínstead of t- tf.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 6.
If Bk'Kk(t) - ál Bk'L(t), t- t0tl,...,tf, k- 1,2,...,N, then
k
Bk'gk(t) -~ Bk'f(t), t- tOtl,...,tf, k- 1,2,...,N.
Proof . N
step 1: f(t) - E ai gi(t), t- tOfl,...,tf.
i-1
~roof :
We prove this by induction:
(i) t- tf: imrediately clear from (18a) and (19a).
(ii) suppose it is true for t- t',t'fl,...,tf, then it is easy
to see from (18b') and ( 19b), using lamia 3 and lemna 5a,
that it is also txue for t- t'-1.
step 2: Bi'gj(t) - 0, i~ j , i- 1,2,...,N, j- 1,2,...,N, t- tOfl,...,tf.
Proof e
From lemma 5b we know
Bi'Kj(t) - O, 1~ Jr 1- 1,2,...,N, j- 1,2,...,N, t-~f 1,...,tf.
Using ( 16a) and ( 16b') we firxi:
(20) Bi'F'Qj(tf)F - 0, i~ J, i- 1,2,...,N, j- 1,2,...,N and
Bi'F'Qj (t)F f Bi' (ItA)'E 1(tfl)'Kj (tfl) (IfA) - 0,
t- tOtl,...rtf-1, 1 ~ J, 1- 1,2,...,N, j- 1,2,...,N.
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Furthermore, we know from the fact that Kj(ttl) is
symmetric and positive semi-definite, from the model
assumptions and from lemma 4b, that both Qj(t) and
E-1(ttl)'Kj(tfl) are symmetric and positive semi-
definite. By the same reasoning as used in proving
lemma 5b, where Bi' and F'Qj(t)F, respectively
Bi'(IfA)' and E-1(tfl)'Kj(tfl), play the róle of
Hi' and K~(tf), we can conclude that:
(21) Bi'F'Q~(t)F - 0, i~ Ji 1- 1,2,...,N, j- 1,2,...,N, t - t~fl,...rtf:lr
arid
(22) Bi'(IfA)'É 1(ttl)'Kj(tfl) - Bi'(ItA)'Kj(tfl) É1(ttl) - 0,
f
lesnna 4b
1~ j, 1- 1,2,...,N, j- 1,2,...,N, t- t tl,...,tf
~
Postmultiplication of both sides of equation (22) with
t?(tt]) yiclds:
(23) Bi'(ItA)'Kj(tfl) - 0, i~ J, i. - 1,2,...,N, j- 1,2,...,N, t - t~tl,...,tf-1.
Now we will evaluate E-1(tfl)', t- t~,t~fl,...,tf-1:
N
É1(tfl)' - D 1(ttl)' - I-L(tfl)B( E aiRi(t)fB'L(ttl)B)-1 B' .
f f i-1
lem~na 3 defin.ition
Because we assumed Rij(t) - 0, i~ j, and because
Bi'Kj(ttl) - 0, i~ j, and Bk'Kk(tfl)- ál Bk'L(tfl),
i- 1,2,...,N, j- 1,2,...,N, k- 1,2,..k,N, we can write:
N





Ri(t) f B'L(ttl)B - ~ ~ . ,
o at,rR~(t)tBN'a~(tfl)BN
E 1(tfl)' - I- Ia1Kl~f1)Bl....a~(ttl)BV ) M 1(t) [B1...BN ]' -
- I - E Ki(ttl)Bi(Rii(t)fBi'Ki(tfl)Bi)-1 Bi' .
i-1
Now we are ready to prove step 2.
We will do this again by induction:
(i) t- tf: obvious from (18a) and (20).
(ii) Suppose it is true for t- t',t'tl,...,tf.
Starting from (18b'), using (21) and (22), we find:
Bi'gj(t'-1) - Bi'(I-1.A)'E 1(t')'gj(t')r i~ Jr i- 1,2,...,Ni j- 1,2,...,N.
Taking account of (23) and the induction ass~tion Bi'gj(t') - 0,
after substituting (24), we are left with:
Bi'gj(t'-1) - Bi'(IfA)'gj(t'). i~ J. i- 1,2,...,N, j- 1,2,...,N.
Now consider (23) again:
B.'(IfA)'Kj(t) - Or 1~ Ji 1- 1,2,...,N, j- 1,2,...,N, t- t~t2,...,tf.1
With Bi'(ItA)' in the róle of Bi' we have the same situation
as in the beginning of the proof of step 2. Following the
same reasoning as we did before, we arrive successively at:
(20') Bi'(IfA)'F'Qj(tf)F - 0, i~ J. i- 1,2,...,N, j- 1,2,...,N.
N
(21') Bi'(ItA)'F'Qj(t)F - Or i~ J, i- 1,2,...,N, j-1,2,...,N,
t-tOt2,...,tf1.
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(22') Bi'(IfA)'2 E 1(ttl)' Kj(ttl) - 0 i~j, 1-1,2,...,N, j-1,2,...,N
(23') Bi'(IfA)'2 Kj(ti-1) - 0, i~j~ i-1~2~...,N, j-1,2,...,N, t-tDf2,...,tf1,
and, with induction assumption Bi'gj (t'fl) - 0 this time,
Bi'gj(t'-1) - Bi'(IfA)'gj(t') -
- Bi'(IfA)'2 E-1(t'tl)'gj(t'tl) -
- Bi'(ItA)'2 gj(t'fl)i~~Jr1-1~2,...,N,J-1,2,...,N.
Continuing this process we will finally find:
Bi'gj(t'-1) - Bi'(ItA)~(tft'tl)gJ(tf) -
i( J( f) J( f i-1 2 N 1 2--B.' IfA)'(tf tt}1)K. t}~. t ) i l~Ji r i...r rJ- i r...,N:
and also
B.'(IfA '(tf-t~t1)K.(t )- 0 i i- 1 21 ) J f i~Jr r i...,N, j- 1,2,...,N,
so that
Bi'gj(t'-1) - ~, 1~ Ji 1- 1,2,...rN, J- 1,2,...,N.
(].) ~- (ii): Bi'gj(t) - 0, i~j, i- 1,2,...,N, j- 1,2,...,N, t- t~tlr---,tf-
step 3: for all t E{t~tl,...,tf} and k E{1,2,...,N} we have:
N
al Bk'f(t) - ál ~' E aigi(t) - ál ~'akgk(t) - B~'gk(t) .
k r k i-1 ~ k
step 1 step 2
Q.E.D.
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By now we have almost proved the main result of this paragraph,
namely sufficient conditions for the (closed-loop) N.O.-solution
to be P.O.. We will state this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.
The (closed-loop) N.O.-solution of the linear quadratic difference
game is P.O. if for some vector a E]EtN, with ak ~ 0, k- 1,2,...,N,
Nand E ak - 1,
k-1
Bk'Kk(t) - 1 Bk~ L(t), k-1,2r...,N, t-t~tl,...,tfr
aIS
where Kk(t) and L(t) are the solutions of the backward recursive
Riccati equations (16a), (16b) resp. (17a),(17b).
Proof .
We will prove this by induction, comparing (14a) and (15a):
(i) t- t~: We know x~(t0) - x(t~) - x~.
By lemma 3 we know E(t~tl) - D(t~fl).
Furthermore, for k - 1,2,...,N:
N
R~ 1(to)Bk'Kk(tOtl)E 1(t~tl) lEl Bi Rii 1(t0}Bi'gi(t~tl) t
-R~ 1(t~)Bk'gk(t~tl) -
N





- -R~ 1(t~)Bk'(I-É 1(t~}1)'-7c(t~fl) k-7tk 1(t~)Bk~)gk(tOtl) -
f
lemna 5b
















- - ~ R~ 1(t~)Bk'E 1(tDtl)'(E'(t~fl)-iE1Ki(tOfl)BiRii 1(t~)Bi')f(t~fl)-
--ak R~ 1(t0)Bk'È 1(t~fl)'f(tDfl) -
~
definition
- - ~ R~ 1(t~)Bk'D 1(t~tl)'f(t~tl).
f
lemma 3
Hence, we can conclude u~k(tD) - uk(t~), k- 1,2,...,N, for
this vector a E Il2N.
(ii.) S1.tppOSe u~k(t) - Llk(t) for t- t0,t~fl,...,t'r k- 1,2,...,N,
for this vector a E Il2N, then also
x~(t) - x(t) for t- tD,tDfl,...,t'fl.
The same reasoning as in (i) gives us:
uk(t'fl) - uk(t'tl), k- 1,2,...,N, for this vector a E~ZN.
Q.E.D.
The conditions are not necessary.
For example, suppose that the matrices (IfA), B and C have zeros
on their fírst rows and suppose that the N.O.-solution is P.O. or,
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equivalently,
u~k(t) - uk(t), k- 1,2,...,N, t- tO,tOtl,...,tf-1, for some
N
vector á E 7RN, with ák ~ 0, k- 1,2,...,N, and E ák - 1,
then also x~(t) - x(t), t- tO,tOfl,...,tf,
k-1
and x~(t), t- tOtl,...,tf, has zero as its first element.
Comparing (14b) and (15b) we see that this situation is very well
compatible with a situation where ak Bk'L(t) and Bk'Kk(t),
k- 1,2,...,N, t- tOtl,...,tf, differ in their first column
for all vectors a E Il2N, with ak ~ 0, k- 1,2,...,N, and
N
E ak - 1.
k-1
5. Conclusion.
In the last paragraph of this paper, we have derived a
sufficient condition for a(closed-loop) N.O.-strategy to be
P.O. (under the assumption that Rij(t) - 0 for i~ j), which
actually means that ín such a case not all the players have
an incentive to cooperate.
Given a quadratic, strict convex cost functíonal and assuming
that the dynamic behaviour of the economy is described by a
system of linear difference equations as stated under problem 1
on page 13, then there will be no incentive to cooperate if the
condition of theorem 2 is fulfilled. What does this condition
mean? aJ.
Considering auj t (i~j) and taking account of (20), (20'),
(21'), etc., we find:
t -t~Ji - ~ (ax(tfT) )~ aJi -
au.(t) T-1 auj t) ax(tfT)7
tf-t
- E Bj' (IfA)
~T-1 F,~Ql(ttT)FIx(ti.T)-Ri(tfT)) - O
T-1
(i-1,2,...rN: 7-1,2,...iN ~~J i t-t~,t~fl,...,tf-1)i
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so that the sufficient condition implies that the cost functional
of any one player is not influenced by the strategies of the
other players.
This ís, obviously, a very stringent condition, but, fortunately,
it is not necessary for a N.O.-solution to be P.O.
Therefore, we consider paragraph 3, where the set of all P.O.-
sérategies for the linear-quadratic difference game and the
corresponding P.O.-costs are derived, as the main part of this
paper. In practice, it will be useful to compute the N.O.-
strategy and the set of P.O.-strategies for each player, so that
both types of strategies can be compared. The policy-maker has
to make a trade-off between the N.O.- and the P.O.-costs, in
order to decide for cooperation or not.
Interesting could be to consider randomized decisions.
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